A more effective approach to dealing with the panic was illustrated by Korea=s second
IMF program, signed on December 24, 1997. The first IMF program, like its predecessors in
Thailand and Indonesia, relied heavily on fiscal and monetary austerity and a closure of banks (in
this case, merchant banks, which had less effect on undermining depositor confidence than closing
commercial banks as in Indonesia). Within weeks, the financial panic had only intensified, and it
was clear the initial approach was failing. The second program eased off on the monetary and
fiscal targets, and had as its centerpiece a restructuring of Korean bank loans owed to
international banks. For the first time in the Asia crisis, the creditors were finally asked to be
involved and make some adjustment. $24 billion in short-term debt falling due in the first quarter
of 1998 was rescheduled to 1-3 year bonds. This approach went to the heart of the pressure on
the won, and almost immediately the exchange rate began to appreciate and the panic subsided.
The restructuring was far from ideal, since the creditors were given even higher interest rates than
the original debts carried, and the new bonds were generously guaranteed by the Korean
government, but nevertheless it helped stop the panic.