The issue, properly framed, is whether the benefits from higher interest rates are likely to
be larger than the costs in the midst of a financial panic. The IMF=s pronouncements in the early stages of the crisis simply took it as an unchallenged matter of faith that the gains would outweigh the costs. However, the most detailed study on the issue to date, by Furman and Stiglitz (1998),casts serious doubt on that view. They show that the magnitude of both the benefits and the costs are likely to differ by country and will depend on the composition of both the foreign creditors and the debtors, and the structure of the domestic banking system. Different outcomes are possible, depending on the extent of both foreign and domestic currency debt, the maturity structure of the debt, the financial condition of the banking system, and the extent of segmentation of local credit markets. Higher interest rates are not a one-size-fits-all remedy. Furman and Stiglitz argue, convincingly, that the structure of the Asian economies made it far less likely --indeed unlikely -- that high interest rates were the appropriate course of action in Asia. Their empirical evidence shows that there was a weak link, at best, between higher interest rates and the exchange rate in the early months of the Asian crisis, and that the costs of the policy to domestic firms and banks were high.