Second, the Asian crisis makes clear the dangers of fixed, or nearly-fixed exchange rates.
Fixed rates have been advocated as a means of reducing volatility in relatively thin currency
markets. They can also be useful as a means of providing a price anchor in specific circumstances, such as halting a hyperinflation. But while flexible markets may be more prone to regular volatility, fixed rates are more susceptible to huge shifts when they can no longer be defended. Government efforts to stick to a promise that it obviously no longer can keep simply breeds instability. Attempts by both Thailand and Korea to defend their exchange rates in the face of speculative attacks simply led to an exhaustion of usable foreign exchange reserves and ultimately a huge depreciation of their currencies. We are not aware of an example of a significant financial or currency crisis in an emerging market with fully flexible exchange rates. Increasingly, the choice for emerging markets is between, on the one hand, surrendering monetary policy completely through adoption of another country=s currency or introducing a strong currency board, or on the other hand adopting a freely-floating currency.