In recent months, supporters of the high interest rates have counter-argued that while the
effects were not immediate, once the Asian countries held firmly on monetary policy for an
extended period of time, the economies eventually stabilized. They point to the appreciation of
the won and baht in early 1998, and of the rupiah in mid-1998 as evidence, and the lower interest rates that followed in each case. This argument is unconvincing. Once all the short-term foreign capital had left (or had been rescheduled or defaulted upon) and the panic subsided, exchange rates were bound to stabilize and even rebound, since exchange rates initially overshot any sensible level as a result of the first stage of the panic. Moreover, several other factors helped stabilize the Asian currencies, including the appreciation of the Japanese yen, disbursements in official foreign financial support (which were originally very slow in Thailand and Indonesia) and the redesign of IMF programs. Finally, while sustained high interest rates may have contributed to the eventual strengthening of these currencies, that by itself does not justify the policy, since the costs to banks and firms were very high, and the interest rate policy may have helped to trigger the panic in the first place.